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Many tasteless jokes center around the assertion that “women
can’t drive.”1 While the belief that women are inferior drivers may
have little basis in fact, with severe modification this notion can be
morphed into a much more tenable claim. Were one to declare that
“women, on average, can’t drive as well as men at similar blood alco-
hol concentrations,” one would have a claim strongly supported by
scientific fact, if a less convenient punch line. Although the body of
research on the subject could benefit from some expansion, those
studies that do exist strongly indicate that, generally, the effects of
alcohol on a woman at a given Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC)2
serve to impair her ability to drive more than they would a man.3
The problem of drunk driving in the United States is assuredly
not an appropriate subject for jokes. In 2007, over 15,000 people died
1. See, e.g., Ricky Tanner, AskMen.com, Top 10: Reasons Women Can’t Drive,
http://www.askmen.com/top_10/cars/top-10-reasons-women-cant-drive.html (last visited
Jan. 6, 2010) (listing ten of the most common stereotypes regarding the relative driving
ability of women).
2. This is also referred to as “blood alcohol content” or “blood alcohol level.”
3. See infra Part II (providing a detailed description of this evidence).
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in alcohol-related car crashes.4 Although this statistic may overstate
the problem to some degree, as these fatalities are not necessarily
caused by drunk drivers,5 alcohol is still certainly responsible for a
large amount of death and injury and is undoubtedly a serious dan-
ger.6 In 2007, police arrested more than 1.4 million people for driving
under the influence of alcohol or other substances.7 While that may
be a substantial number, it comprises less than one percent of the
approximately 150 million self-reported adult drunk driving incidents
in the United States each year.8
Through the years, courts have become increasingly cognizant
of the dangers drunk drivers pose.9 Legislators too have sought var-
ious means to prevent and punish drunk driving,10 one of the most
recent being 0.08% per se drunk driving statutes.11 Conventional
drunk driving statutes penalized driving while intoxicated, necessi-
tating proof of actual impairment in order to sustain a conviction.12
Per se statutes, on the other hand, make driving at a given BAC a
crime in itself, thus requiring no proof that an individual was
actually impaired while driving.13
4. Alcohol Alert, 2007 Drunk Driving Statistics, http://www.alcoholalert.com/drunk
-driving-statistics-2007.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
5. Id. Crashes are said to be “alcohol related” if at least one driver or non-occupant
is found to have a BAC of 0.01 or higher. Therefore, if an accident merely involved a
driver or even a pedestrian that had consumed any alcohol, a fatality stemming from
that crash would be considered alcohol related, regardless of causation. Id.
6. See id. (outlining statistics regarding alcohol-related motor vehicle fatalities).
7. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TABLE 29: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARRESTS, UNITED
STATES (2007), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html.
8. Kyran P. Quinlan et al., Alcohol-Impaired Driving Among U.S. Adults, 1993-
2002, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 346, 348 (2005) (citing statistics from 2002 in which 159
million adults self-reported driving under the influence).
9. See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one
can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest
in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation’s
roads are legion.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (urging acknowledgment of “the continuing slaughter upon our Nation’s highways,
a good percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because
of alcohol or drug ingestion”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) (detailing
the “tragic frequency” of “[t]he carnage caused by drunk drivers”); Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our highways . . . now reaches
the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield.”) (citation omitted); McLean v.
Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We recognize the tremendous toll of death,
injury, and grief caused by those who, under the influence of alcohol or drugs, drive steel
juggernauts capable of high speeds and devastating destruction.”).
10. Burg v. Mun. Ct., 673 P.2d 732, 735 (Cal. 1983).
11. Nationmaster.com, Drunk Driving, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/
Drunk-driving (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
12. Burg, 673 P.2d at 735.
13. Virginia’s drunk driving statute is a representative example:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle,
engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of
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Per se statutes may have many positive effects, but in light of the
scientific evidence indicating that women are generally more impaired
than men at the same BAC,14 they also create the potential for dis-
crimination against men. The use of the same standard for two physio-
logically different classes results in an uneven impact of the law. An
average man and woman, both driving with the same BAC, are not
likely to be equally dangerous, yet the law treats them as such. Per
se statutes make actual impairment irrelevant with regard to crim-
inal liability. As a result, men, as compared to women, may be paying
a steep price.
That price might be acceptable if per se laws were sufficiently
effective. Unfortunately, the extent to which per se laws accomplish
their goal is less certain than some would have us believe.15 This raises
the question as to whether per se drunk driving statutes benefit soci-
ety, by saving lives, so as to justify their discriminatory impact on
men. This Note argues that they do not.
Part I recounts the history of drunk driving statutes and looks
specifically at how per se statutes have been dealt with in the courts.
Part II explores the scientific evidence that women are more impaired,
on average, at a given BAC than men, as suggested by both laboratory
studies and real-world crash data. Part III lays out how these physio-
logical differences result in discrimination and examines the effective-
ness of per se statutes in order to weigh the costs of per se statutes
against their purported benefits. Part IV proposes alternatives to
per se laws that can be enacted today and planned for in the future.
I. HISTORY OF THE BAC AND THE LAW
A. What is BAC?
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) is, as the name suggests, the
amount of alcohol in the blood.16 It is measured as weight per unit
0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210
liters of breath as indicated by a chemical test administered as provided in
this article, (ii) while such person is under the influence of alcohol . . . .
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2008). Note that the statute retains the more conventional
form of drunk driving statute that focuses on the actual influence of alcohol on the driver.
As such, a driver may be convicted for having a BAC of 0.08 or higher while driving, or
for being sufficiently impaired.
14. See infra Part II for an extensive survey of this evidence.
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHWAY SAFETY: EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE
.08 BLOOD ALCOHOL LAWS 2 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99179
.pdf [hereinafter HIGHWAY SAFETY].
16. Univ. N.C. Highway Safety Research Ctr., Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC),
http://www.hsrc.unc.edu/safety_info/alcohol/blood_alcohol_concentration.cfm (last visited
Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Blood Alcohol Concentration].
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of volume and is most often converted to a percentage.17 For instance,
if a person’s BAC was measured at 0.10%, this would indicate that
one tenth of one percent of his blood consisted of alcohol.18
After one ingests alcohol, “it first travels to the stomach, where
a small amount might be absorbed through the stomach lining into
the bloodstream. After a certain length of time, the alcohol passes into
the small intestine from which it is rapidly absorbed into the blood
and carried throughout the body.”19 It is when the alcohol arrives in
the brain that it starts to have an effect, and signs associated with
alcohol intoxication become observable.20 The more alcohol in the
blood, the greater the effects, and in this way, an individual’s BAC
can provide some indication as to how impaired that person may be.21
B. Early Statutory History of BAC
For well over a century, those concerned with vehicular safety
have recognized at least some degree of the danger associated with
the operation of vehicles while drunk.22 As early as the nineteenth
century, the railroad industry instituted sanctions for operating
vehicles under the influence of alcohol.23 The first arrest for driving
an automobile while drunk was of a London taxi driver in 1897.24
General societal concern over drunk drivers started becoming evi-
dent near the turn of the century. One editorialist stated in 1904,
“[i]nebriates and moderate drinkers are the most incapable of all
persons to drive motor wagons. The general palsy and diminished
power of control of both the reason and the senses are certain to in-
vite disaster in every attempt to guide such wagons.” 25 In 1910, New
York became the first state to adopt a drunk driving law.26 Other
states followed suit thereafter.27 Given the increasing prevalence of
the car and the failure of Prohibition in the following years, it became
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Jennifer L. Pariser, Note, In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol
Presumptions in State Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 141, 145-46 (1989)
(citations omitted).
20. Id. at 146 (citation omitted).
21. Blood Alcohol Concentration, supra note 16.
22. JAMES E. GIRARD, CRIMINALISTICS: FORENSIC SCIENCE AND CRIME 311 (2008).
23. Id.
24. History Channel, This Day in History: First Drunk Driving Arrest, http://www
.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=VideoArticle&id=52850 (last visited Jan. 6,
2010). The driver was fined twenty-five schillings. Id.
25. Editorial, 26 Q.J. INEBRIETY 296, 308-09 (1904).
26. Nationmaster.com, supra note 11.
27. Id.
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increasingly clear that legislation was necessary for a safe coexis-
tence of alcohol and automobiles in society.28
It was not until the early 1900s that the first scientific studies
began to shed light on alcohol’s effects on human physiology.29 The
earliest drunk driving statutes included no legal limit on BAC, only
a prohibition on driving while impaired.30 As our understanding of
alcohol’s interaction with blood and the body developed, states began
to incorporate the BAC into statutes.31 Indiana was the first to do so
in 1939.32 This first wave of legislation did not create per se statutes,
but rather allowed for the use of BAC as evidence of intoxication; sub-
sequent laws created a presumption of intoxication at a given BAC.33
C. The Introduction of Per Se Laws
Few, if any, scientific studies had as much impact on the devel-
opment of drunk driving laws as the Grand Rapids Study conducted
in 1964.34 The study surveyed more than 17,000 drivers at roadblocks
and compiled data which was then compared to data from drivers who
had been involved in crashes.35 The study was conclusive in determin-
ing that, generally speaking, as BAC increased, the chances of involve-
ment in an accident increased as well.36 The Grand Rapids Study was
also successful in legitimizing the Breathalyzer, an invention of the
study’s conductor, Robert Borkenstein.37 A device for measuring BAC
through one’s breath, the Breathalyzer provided the convenience and
ease of use that blood tests could not.38 The Breathalyzer would be
key to the enforcement of per se drunk driving laws that followed as
a result of the study.39
28. GIRARD, supra note 22, at 311.
29. A History of the Science and Law Behind DUI, TRAFFIC SAFETY CENTER NEWSL.
(Univ. Cal. Berkeley Traffic Safety Center, Berkeley, Cal.), Summer 2003, available at
http://www.tsc.berkeley.edu/newsletter/Summer03/TSCNewsletter_Summer03.pdf.
30. Nationmaster.com, supra note 11.
31. GIRARD, supra note 22, at 311.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. (indicating the significance of the Grand Rapids Study and its lead author
Robert F. Borkenstein, who also invented the Breathalyzer); see also R.F. BORKENSTEIN
ET AL., THE ROLE OF THE DRINKING DRIVER IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (Alan Dale ed., 1964)
(presenting the findings of the Grand Rapids study).
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In 1966, only two years after the study was published, the first
per se drunk driving laws were adopted in the United States.40 Origi-
nally formulated in Sweden and Norway in the late 1930s and 1940s,
these new laws shifted the means by which prosecutors needed to
prove intoxication.41 Rather than require the prosecution to show
actual impairment, these new statutes made having a certain BAC
a crime.42 Thus, prosecutors were only required to prove that a cer-
tain ratio of alcohol to blood existed in the driver.43 Lauded, perhaps
undeservedly,44 for its deterrent effects, this type of drunk driving
law was dubbed the “Scandinavian Model” and drew the attention
of Americans.45 In the wake of the Grand Rapids Study, and given
the availability of the convenient Breathalyzer,46 the Scandinavian
Model eventually made its way to the United States.47
Anti-drunk driving organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD) worked to make the prevention of drunk driving
a national issue48 and led the push, beginning in the 1980s, to lower
the per se drunk driving statutes’ legal BAC limit to 0.08%.49 Prior
to this time, not all states had per se statutes, and those that did typi-
cally set the upper limit as high as 0.15%.50 Though technically each
state has discretion with regard to the drunk driving laws it enacts,
the anti-drunk-driving lobby was successful at convincing the federal
government to require states to enact 0.08% BAC per se statutes in
order to receive federal highway funding.51 By July of 2004, every
40. John Hoffman, Note, Implied Consent with a Twist: Adding Blood to New Jersey’s
Implied Consent Law and Criminalizing Refusal Where Drinking and Driving Results




44. H. Laurence Ross, The Scandinavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-
Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 285 (1975). After
visiting Norway and Sweden, the author published this study, stating, “The visit found
that the widespread belief in the deterrent effect of the Swedish and Norwegian laws
has little solid support.” Id.
45. Hoffman, supra note 40, at 348.
46. GIRARD, supra note 22, at 311.
47. Hoffman, supra note 40, at 348.
48. GIRARD, supra note 22, at 311-12. This goal has been decidedly accomplished. As
one justice noted, “[u]ncompromising enforcement of laws designed to rid our highways
of the scourge of the drunk driver ranks only slightly behind the veneration of motherhood
and probably slightly ahead of a robust hankering after apple pie in the hierarchy of
values firmly embedded in our culture.” State v. Tischio, 527 A.2d 388, 397 (N.J. 1987)
(Clifford, J., dissenting).
49. GIRARD, supra note 22, at 312.
50. Id. at 311. Some statutes also included a lower limit under which there was a
presumption of no impairment. Hoffman, supra note 40, at 349.
51. GIRARD, supra note 22, at 312. Other drinking-related legislative conditions were
included as well, such as setting the legal drinking age at 21, a requisite with a more
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state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had enacted 0.08%
BAC per se drunk driving laws.52
D. Per Se Laws in the Courts
Since these laws have been enacted, per se drunk driving statutes
have been challenged on a variety of constitutional grounds and have
been consistently upheld as constitutional.53
1. Burg v. Municipal Court
One representative example is the litigation that took place in
California after that state adopted per se legislation in 1981.54 As with
many states, California’s original per se statutes set the limit at 0.10%
and lowered it some years later.55 Two years after the original legis-
lation was passed, the state supreme court considered the constitu-
tionality of California’s per se statute in Burg v. Municipal Court.56
The court first made clear its recognition of the severity of the
issue, stating, “[t]he drunk driver cuts a wide swath of death, pain,
grief, and untold physical and emotional injury across the roads of
California and the nation.” 57 The court then noted that it “[had] no
difficulty concluding that the 0.10[%] figure . . . is rationally related
to the exercise of the state’s legitimate police power.” 58
a. Due Process
The court then considered a due process argument against the
statute.59 The appellant argued that the court should find the statute
tenuous connection to highways than the requirement of the 0.08% per se drunk driving
statute. Although some argue that these conditions unjustifiably infringe on state sover-
eignty, they have been decisively ruled constitutional. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206 (1987) (“Here, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage
uniformity in the States’ drinking ages. As we explain below, we find this legislative effort
within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly.”).
52. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DRUNK DRIVING LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 2004-
2005 (2005), available at http://64.26.129.106/DWI_SystemImprovements/documents/
HotDWIIssues forLegislators_Mejeur_notes.pdf.
53. Christopher H. Hall, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Statutes Directly Proscribing Driving with Blood-Alcohol Level in Excess of Established
Percentage, 54 A.L.R.4TH 149, 154-55 (1987).
54. Burg v. Mun. Ct., 673 P.2d 732, 733-34 (Cal. 1983).
55. Id. at 736; NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 52.
56. Burg, 673 P.2d at 736.
57. Id. at 734.
58. Id. at 738-39.
59. Id. at 739.
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unconstitutional given an appropriate application of the “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine.60 Although this argument had been made pre-
viously and was rejected by the courts of other states,61 the appellant
argued that those prior decisions “fail[ed] to sufficiently analyze the
issues and justify the results.” 62 As the court explained, “[t]oday it is
established that due process requires a statute to be definite enough
to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are pro-
scribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertain-
ment of guilt.” 63 The appellant argued that the statute violated the
first of these two prongs, the “fair notice” requirement, by setting
an exact limit of 0.10%.64 As individuals do not typically know what
their BAC is at any given time while drinking or when they begin to
drive, the appellant argued, they never know when they may be com-
mitting a criminal act.65 The court rejected this argument as well,
and noted that, generally, knowing that if you drink before driving
you run the risk of breaking the law sufficiently satisfies the notice
requirement as it has traditionally been interpreted.66
2. Breathalyzer Reliability
The reliability of the Breathalyzer has historically served as
further grounds to challenge per se laws. These challenges, however,
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Van Brunt v. State, 646 P.2d 872, 873 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“[A]ll
that need be shown in order to secure a conviction for driving while intoxicated on an
under the influence theory is that the defendant intentionally drank and intentionally
drove; it need not be shown that the defendant knew that he was in fact under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.”); Fuenning v. Super. Ct., 680 P.2d 121, 127-29 (Ariz. 1983)
(“Where a statutes gives fair notice of what is to be avoided or punished, it should not be
declared void for vagueness simply because it may be difficult for the public to determine
how far they can go before they are in actual violation.”); Roberts v. State, 329 So.2d 296,
297 (Fla. 1976) (rejecting a void-for-vagueness argument that claims “that consumers . . .
are unable to determine how much alcohol they may consume before their alcohol blood
level will make it unlawful for them to drive” as well as one that suggested that since
the state statute failed “to state whether the prohibited percentage of alcohol in the
driver’s bloodstream is by weight or by volume,” it is void); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d
805, 807-08 (Utah 1974) (“We can see no reason why a person of ordinary intelligence
would have any difficulty in understanding that if he has drunk anything containing
alcohol, and particularly any substantial amount thereof, he should not attempt to drive
or take control of a motor vehicle.”); State v. Franco, 639 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Wash. 1982)
(basing its decision that the statute at hand was not void-for-vagueness because “it is
reasonable to assume that the physical and mental condition of a driver with such a high
level of alcohol is impaired”).
62. Burg, 673 P.2d at 739.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 740.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 741.
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have time and again been rejected. For example, a series of three
cases, State v. Johnson,67 State v. Lentini,68 and State v. Downie,69
effectively “[foreclosed] scientific attacks on the Breathalyzer” in New
Jersey.70 This occurred despite recognition by the court in Downie
“that 2.3% of the population could be wrongfully convicted of a per
se [sic] violation” due to faulty assumptions used in the calibration
of the Breathalyzer.71 These decisions solidified New Jersey’s legal
acknowledgment of the Breathalyzer’s dependability, forcing lower
New Jersey courts to take judicial notice and no longer accept scien-
tific attacks on the test’s accuracy.72
3. Blood Alcohol Content vs. Breath Alcohol Content
The distinction between blood alcohol content and breath alco-
hol content has also prompted litigation. Washington, for instance,
amended its per se statute in 1986 to penalize having a breath alcohol
content of 0.10% rather than a certain blood alcohol content.73 Prior
to the change, breath alcohol content, as ascertained by a Breath-
alyzer test, was merely evidence of the blood alcohol level.74 Defen-
dants would typically introduce evidence that attempted to show that
their breath alcohol content was not an accurate indicator of their
blood alcohol content.75 The amended law directly made having a
0.10% breath alcohol content illegal, eliminating the need for prose-
cutors to belie claims that a defendant’s blood alcohol content was
not reflected by his breath alcohol content.76
Two years after the amendment, the state supreme court consid-
ered constitutional challenges to the law in State v. Brayman.77 The
appellant made claims of due process and equal rights violations, both
of which the court found to be without merit.78 Additionally, the defen-
dant presented evidence of questionable legislative intent.79 The evi-
dence presented showed that “one senator, a representative from the
67. State v. Johnson, 199 A.2d 809, 809. 825 (N.J. 1964).
68. State v. Lentini, 573 A.2d 464, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
69. State v. Downie, 569 A.2d 242, 251 (N.J. 1990).
70. E. John Wherry, Jr., The Rush to Convict DWI Offenders: The Unintended
Unconstitutional Consequences, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 429, 448 (1994).
71. Id. at 447.
72. Id. at 448.




77. Id. at 296-97.
78. Id. at 297-99, 301-03.
79. Id. at 305-06.
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Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, and a Washington
State Patrol sergeant . . . [made comments] to the effect that the
Legislature meant to eliminate defense experts’ testimony about
blood-breath ratios, confusing the jury, and dragging things out.” 80
This evidence, however, did not factor into the court’s decision.81
4. An Exception
One exception to the continual affirmation of the constitution-
ality of these laws occurred in Virginia in 2005 when Judge Ian M.
O’Flaherty of the Fairfax County District Court dismissed three
drunk driving cases on the ground that the per se law was unconsti-
tutional, as it violated “a defendant’s right to the presumption of
innocence.” 82 Although Judge O’Flaherty’s ruling was made orally
and thus his rationale was not preserved for posterity, it is possible
that O’Flaherty, in making this decision, considered the reliability
of the test as an indicator of impairment at the time the offense was
committed.83 O’Flaherty cited Francis v. Franklin, a United States
Supreme Court case from the 1980s holding that each element of a
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.84 Yet the defense
lawyer who argued the case before O’Flaherty contended that the
per se law was problematic because it presumed intoxication at
0.08%.85 Additionally, the law presumed that the results of a BAC
test were indicative of BAC levels at the time of the accident, despite
being taken hours later.86 These factors have led some scholars to
disagree with the holding of Francis. A.E. Dick Howard, Professor
of Constitutional Law at the University of Virginia, stated, “I think
the Francis case simply does not apply, not like this.” 87
As this was a district court ruling establishing no formal prece-
dent, the decision has yet to inspire similar decisions. Some believe
this decision has, however, opened the door to the argument that the
law could be found unconstitutional. As Steven Oberman, chairman
of the DUI Defense Committee at the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, stated, “[t]here will be similar motions everywhere,
80. Id. at 305.
81. Id. at 305-06.
82. Jamie Stockwell & Tommy Nguyen, Dismissals Of DUI Cases Jolt Lawyers:
Optimism, Anxiety After Fairfax Ruling, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2005, at B1.
83. Id.
84. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985); see also Stockwell & Nguyen,
supra note 82, at B1 (restating the Francis ruling).
85. Stockwell & Nguyen, supra note 82, at B1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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no doubt about that. . . . There are lawyers everywhere who are look-
ing at this issue again in a different light.” 88 Howard, however, dis-
missed the decision as an “idiosyncratic ruling” and noted that if
O’Flaherty’s view was adopted, it “could create massive upheaval and
seismic shock in courtrooms across the country.” 89 All indications
are that O’Flaherty’s decision will be perceived as nothing more than
a misguided anomaly, and will not result in a shift away from view-
ing per se drunk driving laws as constitutional.90
Per se statutes have been challenged on a multitude of other
grounds, including an equal protection91 argument and a suggestion
that the statutes fail to require actual knowledge of the condition they
proscribe.92 Each of these arguments, however, has also ultimately
failed.93 Despite O’Flaherty’s isolated ruling, the constitutionality of
typical per se drunk driving statutes is no longer seriously in dispute.
II. DISCRIMINATION: SAME STANDARD, DIFFERENT PHYSIOLOGIES
Per se statutes are predicated on the assumption that everyone,
upon reaching a certain BAC, is too impaired to drive.94 In reality,
a multitude of factors determine not only what a person’s BAC will
be after consuming a given amount of alcohol, but more importantly,
how impaired that individual will be after attaining a given BAC.
One of these factors is gender.95
Physiological responses to alcohol are complicated and it can be
difficult to differentiate the effects of alcohol on each gender.96 While
there is not an overwhelming number of scientific studies examining
the effects on each gender at given BACs, the studies that have been
completed and the data that is available all support the view that dif-




91. E.g., State v. Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617, 618, 621 (Mo. 1980); State v. Gerdes 252
N.W.2d 335, 335-36 (S.D. 1977).
92. E.g., Van Brunt v. State, 646 P.2d 872, 873 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Burg v. Mun.
Ct., 673 P.2d 732, 740-42 (Cal. 1983).
93. E.g., Van Brunt, 646 P.2d at 873; Burg, 673 P.2d at 740-42; Watts, 601 S.W.2d
at 621; Gerdes, 252 N.W.2d at 336.
94. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 15, at 9.
95. Many academics use the term “gender” to refer to social and cultural traits
associated with each sex. Throughout this Note, however, the term “gender” is used to
refer exclusively to biological sex, unless otherwise noted.
96. Patricia F. Waller & Frederic C. Blow, Women, Alcohol, and Driving, in 12
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ALCOHOLISM: ALCOHOLISM AND WOMEN 103, 114 (Marc
Galanter ed., 1995).
97. Id. at 113-14, 120.
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that the physiological effects on women are different from those of
men at moderate and high BACs, with women performing far worse
at various laboratory tests evaluating motor skills and response to
visual stimuli at elevated BACs.98 Multiple studies have also been
conducted which show statistically significant differences in risk
between men and women at certain BACs.99 Additionally, breath
testing machines may report artificially high BACs in men based on
faulty assumptions regarding levels of plasma in the blood.100 Taken
together, this evidence strongly supports the contention that reliance
solely on the current uniform BAC level of 0.08% is an unacceptably in-
accurate means of determining driver impairment due to unaccounted
for discrepancies arising from gender differences.
In the mid to late nineties, as many state legislatures were de-
bating lowering the legal limit of their per se drunk driving statutes
to 0.08%,101 the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
(NIAAA) reported several findings that should have given lawmakers
pause.102 The NIAAA is part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
an agency of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services.103 The NIH bears the primary responsibility for facilitating,
funding, and compiling biomedical and health-related research for
the United States government.104 The NIAAA, the institute dedicated
to the study of alcohol and its effects, funds a significant amount of
research conducted on such topics in the United States.105
A review of the studies conducted on the issue clearly indicates
that, generally, women are more impaired than men at the same
BAC.106 In the laboratory setting, when asked to respond to visual
98. See Michael R. Elliott et al., Gender Differences Among Young Drivers in the
Association Between High-Risk Driving and Substance Use/Environmental Influences,
67 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 252, 252 (2006), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih
.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1538974 (noting gender-related studies); Waller & Blow,
supra note 96, at 113-14 (noting various gender-related studies).
99. See Paul L. Zador, Alcohol-Related Relative Risk of Fatal Driver Injuries in
Relation to Driver Age and Sex, 52 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 302, 302, 308 (1991) (discussing
gender-related alcohol studies); Waller & Blow, supra note 96, at 113-14 (same).
100. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE §6.3.2 (5th ed. 2000).
101. Point/Counterpoint About .08 Per se Laws, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 30.
102. Are Women More Vulnerable to Alcohol’s Effects?, ALCOHOL ALERT (Nat’l Inst.
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Bethesda, Md.), Dec. 1999, available at http://pubs
.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/aa46.htm; Drinking and Driving, ALCOHOL ALERT (Nat’l
Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Bethesda, Md.), Jan. 1996, available at http://
pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/aa31.htm.
103. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, http://www.niaaa.nih.gov (last
visited Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter NIAAA].
104. NIH, About NIH, http://www.nih.gov/about/#mission (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
105. NIAAA, supra note103.
106. Elliott et al., supra note 98, at 252.
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stimuli, the performance of women lagged well behind that of men.107
An additional study indicated that alcohol has a more significant
effect on the visual functioning of women than of men.108 This study
employed simulated traffic signs shown to subjects on slides;109 women
had more difficulty determining the presence or absence of a sign
while under the influence of alcohol than did men.110 Women also per-
formed poorly in comparison to men in tasks requiring dexterity.111
An additional study of performance on an electronic grid board manual
assembly task by college students in their early twenties also showed
women to be more affected by alcohol over a range of BACs.112 Another
study had a doctor judge individuals’ fitness to drive after consuming
alcohol, and a substantially lower percentage of women than men
were judged fit to drive at the same BAC.113
Evidence of more severe impairment of women relative to men
arises outside of the laboratory as well.114 None other than the water-
shed Grand Rapids study was the first to report that women had a
greater risk of crashing at a given BAC.115 This initial study indicated
that men’s likelihood of involvement in a crash doubled at a BAC of
0.08%, while women at the same BAC increased their risk by nine
times.116 While at least some portion of this higher relative risk may
be attributable to women being generally less experienced drivers at
the time, the study having been conducted in 1964,117 studies con-
ducted since then have consistently confirmed a higher crash risk
for women at the same BAC as men.118
107. C.W. Erwin et al., Alcohol-Induced Drowsiness and Vigilance Performance, 39
J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 505, 509, 512 (1978).
108. Lloyd L. Avant, Alcohol Impairs Visual Presence/Absence Detection More for
Females than for Males, 48 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 285, 288 (1990).
109. Id. at 286-87.
110. Id. at 287-88.
111. D.L. Price et al., Gender, Alcohol, Pacing, and Incentive Effects on an Electronics
Assembly Task, 29 ERGONOMICS 393, 397-403 (1986).
112. Id.
113. Waller & Blow, supra note 96, at 113.
114. See, e.g., Zador, supra note 99 (reporting one study and discussing additional
studies on real-life alcohol and gender crash risk statistics); Are Women More Vulnerable
to Alcohol’s Effects?, supra note 102 (“Although women are less likely than men to drive
after drinking and to be involved in fatal alcohol-related crashes, women have a higher
relative risk of driver fatality than men at similar blood alcohol concentrations.”) (citations
omitted). While studies indicating a higher risk of crashing as a result of the same BAC
are not always necessarily evidence of increased impairment, in this case they are useful
if considered as corroborating evidence for laboratory studies that show differing levels
of impairment at similar BACs.
115. BORKENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34; see also Waller & Blow, supra note 96, at
113 (noting the novelty of the Grand Rapids Study).
116. BORKENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 229.
117. Waller & Blow, supra note 96, at 113.
118. Are Women More Vulnerable to Alcohol’s Effects?, supra note 102.
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In 1972, one study found that women with BACs over 0.05% were
twice as likely as men at the same BAC to be involved in a crash.119 In
1999, the NIAAA, in a report concerning the increased vulnerability
of women to alcohol’s effects in relation to men, reported that with
regard to drunk driving, “women have a higher relative risk of driver
fatality than men at similar blood alcohol concentrations,” citing
studies based on the analysis of actual crash data.120 The cited re-
port, published in 1991, relied on results of a study conducted by the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which concluded that women
have a higher relative risk of being involved in a fatal crash than men
at BACs ranging from 0.05% to 0.09%.121 This study was updated
using more data in 2000, and conductors concluded that, “[w]hen
comparable, results largely confirmed existing prior estimates.”122
International studies align with these findings as well. One study
of French drivers found that women have a much higher crash risk
than men when drinking and driving at night.123 Additionally, a
Swedish study found that of drunk driving arrests, women had a
higher likelihood of being caught due to a crash.124
Not only do men tend to be less impaired than women at a given
BAC, but issues with the measurement of BACs by breath test are
also affected by gender.125 Hematocrit is the percentage by volume
of solid particles in the blood.126 BAC breath-testing machines are
typically calibrated assuming a hematocrit of approximately 0.45%.127
Men typically have a higher hematocrit level, ranging from 0.42% to
0.53%, than women, whose hematocrit levels range from 0.37% to
0.47%.128 Those with higher hematocrit levels test higher on BAC
breath-testing machines;129 therefore, as men have higher hematocrit
119. William L. Carlson, Alcohol Usage of the Nighttime Driver, 4 J. SAFETY RES. 12,
22 (1972).
120. Are Women More Vulnerable to Alcohol’s Effects?, supra note 102.
121. Zador, supra note 99, at 306.
122. Paul L. Zador et al., Alcohol-Related Relative Risk of Driver Fatalities and Driver
Involvement in Fatal Crashes in Relation to Driver Age and Gender: An Update Using
1996 Data, 61 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 387, 387 (2000). This updated study did find, however,
that women aged sixteen to twenty had a lower fatality risk than men with the same
BAC. Id. at 392.
123. Marie Berthe Biecheler-Fretel et al., Drinking and Driving: A Typological
Approach Comparing Men and Women, in WOMEN, ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND TRAFFIC: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP 119, 119-27 (Milan R. Valverius ed., 1988).
124. Wayne Jones et al., Female Drinking Drivers in Sweden, in WOMEN, ALCOHOL,
DRUGS AND TRAFFIC: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC WORKSHOP 43, 49
(Milan R. Valverius ed., 1988).
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levels than women on average, and higher hematocrit levels than
assumed by breath BAC measurement machines, test results will
generally indicate higher BACs for men than women, even if they
actually have the same BAC.130 Thus, not only is a man likely to be
less impaired at a given BAC than a woman, but he is also likely to
measure a higher BAC on a Breathalyzer than a woman with the
same BAC, in effect compounding the problem.
Unfortunately, there is not a sufficient amount of accumulated
research on the subject to draw an ironclad conclusion as to how much
more affected women are, compared to men, at various BACs, espe-
cially with regard to driving. The existing studies indicate a dimin-
ished capacity for driving-essential skills due to alcohol consumption
and, as such, these studies should be a good predictor of driving ability
when the driver is intoxicated. It would be useful to have studies
that test driving impairment itself. The empirical data on crash risk
corroborating these studies suggests that the impairment of skills
indicated by the studies can rightly be considered indicators of driv-
ing impairment as well.
Additional studies on what exactly causes women’s increased
sensitivity to the effects of alcohol would also be useful. Certainly
men drink more than women on average and are much more likely
to have an alcohol abuse problem than women,131 which would make
men more likely to have developed a higher tolerance to alcohol’s
effects.132 Beyond mere behavioral habits, however, physiological
differences also account for the variance in effects.133 Still, complete
explanations for the test results showing women to be more affected
at a given BAC are not yet available. Further research in this area
130. Id. Even Dr. Robert Borkenstein, inventor of the Breathalyzer and conductor of
the Grand Rapids study, testified in Downie that the Breathalyzer was too unreliable
to use in a per se jurisdiction and that “it places too much stress on the machine which
was never intended by the scientists in the field.” Wherry, supra note 70, at 447-48
(quoting Transcript of Record at 184-89, State v. Downie, 569 A.2d 242 (N.J. 1990) (No.
A-33) (remand hearing)).
131. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV., NSDUH REPORT: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ALCOHOL USE AND ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE OR ABUSE: 2004 AND 2005 (2007), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k7/AlcGender/
AlcGender.htm.
132. Alcohol and Tolerance, ALCOHOL ALERT (Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism, Bethesda, Md.), Apr. 1995, available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/
aa28.htm.
133. Be Responsible About Drinking (BRAD), Women and Alcohol, http://www.brad21
.org/alcohol_and_women.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2010) (warning that “[f]luctuating
hormone levels in women means that the intoxicating effects of alcohol will set in faster
when their estrogen levels are higher, premenstrually. Also, alcohol increases the estrogen
levels — birth control pills or other medications with estrogen will cause the intoxicating
effects to set in at lower levels of BAC.”).
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could help provide a better understanding of the way each gender’s
physiology responds to alcohol.
III. ARGUMENT FOR A POLICY SHIFT
A. Why the Law Should be Changed
The previous Part detailed the extent to which science confirms
that, on average, men are less impaired than women at many BACs,
including 0.08%, the current legal limit. The section also detailed how
women have a higher risk of being involved in a crash than men at
or near 0.08%. This presents a problem when considered in the context
of per se drunk driving statutes. These statutes set the legal BAC limit
at the same level for two groups that are generally at different levels
of impairment at that specified BAC. Considering that per se statutes
criminalize driving with a certain BAC, rather than criminalizing a
certain level of impairment, this results in de facto discrimination.
Ideally, laws should not be more permissive of women commit-
ting the same dangerous act than men. Yet that is the exact result of
the per se drunk driving statute. By holding men and women to the
same standard, the law operates under the fallacy that each gender
reacts to alcohol in the same way. In reality, every person reacts to
alcohol differently, as does each gender.
By defining the crime in terms of having a requisite BAC rather
than a requisite level of impairment, the door is opened to punish-
ing those who are not a danger at all. Generally, though certainly
not always, some measurable impairment occurs in many people at
BACs below 0.08%.134 Given women’s higher relative susceptibility
to alcohol’s effects, it is much more likely that a man will be punished
when he is not in fact a danger than it is that the same would happen
to a woman. Therefore women, on average, are permitted to drive at
higher levels of impairment than men. Furthermore, this law makes
it probable that men are convicted and sentenced for driving at the
same or lower levels of impairment as women who go unpunished.135
The intent of such a law, presumably, is to protect citizens from
those who choose to get behind the wheel when their ability to drive is
so impaired that they are a danger. The goal of the state in limiting
134. The ABC’s of BAC: A Guide to Understanding Blood Alcohol Concentration and
Alcohol Impairment, http://stopimpaireddriving.org/ABCsBACWeb/page2.htm (last visited
Jan. 6, 2010).
135. For instance, were a woman to have a 0.078% BAC and a man to have a 0.08%
BAC, the man would be subject to prosecution under a per se statute while the woman
would not, despite the likelihood that the man would be less impaired. See discussion
infra Part III.
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the dangers posed by drunk driving is certainly one that must be pur-
sued. The mistake here is allowing zealous action intended to protect
citizens to lead to an oversimplification in the law that does not allow
for physiological differences in gender. While certainly the 0.08%
per se standard streamlines the enforcement process,136 toleration
of discrimination is a steep price to pay for simplicity.
Assuming there is a level of impairment that should be tolerable
by law, punishment of those persons exceeding this level should be
consistent across genders. The NIAAA, the government’s primary
institute for studies on alcohol, confirms that women are generally
more impaired than men at a given BAC.137 Therefore, setting the
BAC limit at the same level for men and women cannot allow for a
consistent level of tolerable impairment. Along the borderline — men
who are just over the limit and women who are just under — the law
necessarily applies unevenly.
One might argue that the state is justified in setting a BAC
limit at any level it deems appropriate, or even in enacting a “zero-
tolerance policy”138 and banning drinking and driving altogether.
Indeed, it may be constitutionally “justified” in doing this, for as the
California Supreme Court once noted, “[t]he wisdom of the legislation
is not at issue in analyzing its constitutionality, and neither the avail-
ability of less drastic remedial alternatives nor the legislative failure
to solve all related ills at once will invalidate a statute.”139 Though
constitutional, legislatures would do well to carefully consider where
to set BAC limits.
An example of a BAC limitation that may have gone overboard
arose in Washington, D.C., which had a zero tolerance policy on the
books only a few years ago.140 While it was not a per se law, it did
grant the police authority to arrest anyone with a BAC over 0.01%.141
This law was on the books until the Washington Post featured a
story on a woman arrested after having one glass of wine.142 Just
136. Burg v. Mun. Ct., 673 P.2d 732, 735-36 (Cal. 1983).
137. Are Women More Vulnerable to Alcohol’s Effects?, supra note 102.
138. Brigid Schulte, Single Glass of Wine Immerses D.C. Driver in Legal Battle, WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 2005, at A1. The term “zero-tolerance policy” is typically given to statutes
designed to eliminate all drinking and driving, or other types of behavior, with penalties
for what could be considered insignificant infringement. Id.
139. Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512, 518 (Cal.1978).
140. Eric M. Weiss, D.C. Council Votes to Ease No-Tolerance DUI Law, WASH. POST,
Oct. 19, 2005, at A1.
141. Id.
142. Schulte, supra note 138, at A1. Debra Bolton, an energy lawyer in Washington,
D.C., was pulled over for driving without headlights just after leaving a restaurant where
she had one glass of wine with dinner. After explaining that the parking lot attendant
must have disabled her auto-light feature, she Breathalyzed, blew a 0.03% BAC, and was
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a week later, the Post ran another article, this time regarding the city
council’s vote to change the law for fear of the policy becoming a
“national joke.”143 Clearly the public does not support such a policy,
presumably because it believes that a drunk driving law should tar-
get those that are a danger to others, which this type of law does not.
While setting a per se limit at 0.08% will certainly catch a higher
proportion of dangerous drivers than a limit set at 0.01%, it is still
likely that those who are not a significant danger will be punished.
Society should tolerate a level of impairment greater than zero.
To understand why, one must look only to sober drivers, where less
than optimal drivers are tolerated in abundance. The majority of
the adult population drives, and presumably the drivers on the road
encompass a wide range of ability levels. The streets are packed with
unskilled sober drivers, as evidenced by the fact that the majority of
traffic fatalities are caused by sober drivers.144 Yet the best drivers
on the road typically do not clamor for lesser skilled drivers to be
excluded in the interest of safety, nor do legislatures. This is pre-
sumably due to an implicit acknowledgment that sub-optimal drivers
are allowed on the road because their mobility is a net benefit to soci-
ety. Similarly, the majority of people at BACs below 0.08%, while
potentially slightly impaired according to laboratory tests,145 are still
allowed to drive because society recognizes the net positive utility in
allowing them mobility, just as less skilled sober drivers are allowed
on the roads.
It is only beneficial to bar a person from driving when he ade-
quately displays that he is a danger not worth tolerating, drunk or
sober. No law forces the elderly, for instance, to turn over their driver’s
licenses at a certain age, but rather they do so voluntarily or are
forced to after manifesting a sufficient loss of ability, whether when
renewing their licenses or after a vehicular accident.146 In the same
way, we should not penalize drivers merely for reaching a certain
BAC, but rather penalize them only when they manifest an intoler-
able level of impairment. A driver who has been drinking may not
drive as well as he would sober, but may very well retain enough
forced to do several field sobriety tests which the officer claimed she failed. She was taken
to jail and made to sit there until 4:30 AM. Most people arrested under similar circum-
stances did not fight the charge, but instead opted to take a “diversion program” of coun-
seling that D.C. offers. Bolton, however, chose to fight the charge, and after five months
and considerable expense, it was dropped. Id.
143. Weiss, supra note 140, at A1.
144. Alcohol Alert, supra note 4.
145. Blood Alcohol Concentration, supra note 16.
146. Robert Davis & Anthony DeBarros, Stopping Older, Dangerous Drivers a Growing
Problem, USA TODAY, May 2, 2007, at 1A.
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ability even as his BAC increases to justify allowing him to drive,
just as an aging driver is still allowed to drive for some time even
though his ability may have declined from his prime.147
The utility in allowing drivers with some level of impairment
to legally drive stems from various sources. There is significant value
in the freedom and mobility that goes along with driving. Many
people drink alcohol and many live in places where mass transit or
other means of transportation are inadequate. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, eliminating per se laws protects those who are not, in fact,
a significant danger on the road from unjust harassment and arrest
by the police, as well as from undue expense and loss of productivity
due to prosecution. For reasons such as these, lawmakers should
focus on keeping only those drivers who pose a significant threat off
the street, while aiming to avoid, as much as possible, enacting a
law that is over-inclusive. Given that the majority of alcohol-related
traffic deaths occur at or above BACs of 0.15%,148 setting a per se
BAC limit of 0.08% effectively ensures over-inclusion. Due to the
relative resistance of men to alcohol’s effects as compared to women,
men are much more likely to bear the brunt of any over-inclusion
that occurs. Similarly, women as a group are much more likely to
“benefit” as a result of any under-inclusion that stems from per se
laws. Society is then left with a law perpetuating very predictable
discriminatory effects.
Although 0.08% BAC per se drunk driving statutes certainly
have their downside, not the least of which is effective discrimina-
tion against men, they may still be justified as a public policy if they
are sufficiently successful at accomplishing the primary goal of saving
lives. From the beginning, politicians championed per se laws as if
they were a “magic bullet,” as evidenced, for instance, by President
Bill Clinton’s claim that enacting the laws would “result in 600
fewer alcohol-related deaths each year.”149 Deeper digging into the
public debate, however, reveals that not everyone agrees.150 Per se
laws have met some resistance and skepticism, particularly as various
states engaged in internal debate prior to enactment.151 Some of the
fiercest debates arose when states considered lowering their BAC
147. Id.
148. RALPH HINGSON & MICHAEL WINTER, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM OF THE NIH, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONSEQUENCES OF DRINKING AND DRIVING
(2003), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh27-1/63-78.htm.
149. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 15, at 14.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 13-22.
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limits to 0.08% from 0.10%.152 These discussions were particularly
telling, as opposed to initial debates regarding per se laws, because
data and studies then existed for many states with 0.10% per se limits
and from states that had already adopted 0.08% limits.153 During dis-
cussions before legislatures, opponents of per se laws were so effec-
tive at discrediting claims such as Clinton’s that proponents of per se
laws at times abandoned arguments based on statistics in favor of
focusing “on the human and emotional aspects of the debate.”154
While certainly not a “magic bullet” by any means, 0.08% per
se laws can have positive effects if enacted in conjunction with edu-
cation programs.155 Because of the multitude of variables involved,
however, determining the exact efficacy of per se laws is difficult.156
The GAO’s report examining the effectiveness of 0.08% drunk driving
statutes states:
While indications are that .08 BAC laws in combination with
other drunk driving laws as well as sustained public education
and information efforts and strong enforcement can be effective,
the evidence does not conclusively establish that .08 BAC laws
by themselves result in reductions in the number and severity
of crashes involving alcohol. Until recently, limited published evi-
dence existed on the effectiveness of .08 BAC laws, and NHTSA’s
position — that this evidence was conclusive — was overstated.
In 1999, more comprehensive studies have been published that
152. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FINAL REPORT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF .08 PER SE LAWS: ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR AND AGAINST .08 PER
SE (2001), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/pub/alcohol-laws/
08History/4_arguments.htm.
153. Id.
154. Id. The report stated in detail:
Legislators seemed to rely heavily on the testimony of supporters and
opponents as to the findings and the methodology of studies concerning the
effectiveness of .08 per se. Besides discrediting the existing reports as being
flawed and inconclusive, opponents of .08 per se often presented legislators
with statistics of their own. For example, in some instances statistics were
used to show that, when compared to states that had enacted the .08 BAC
limit, the state considering the law had fewer alcohol-related fatalities per
capita, despite the higher BAC limit. Such statistical data was often easier
for legislators to comprehend than the more complex statistical reports
mentioned above. It was a bigger challenge for supporters of .08 per se to
explain in a concise and clear manner the findings and the methodology of
the research. Some of our contacts warned that this “numbers game” is
difficult to win, and it is best for advocates of .08 per se to avoid debates
that focus on figures and statistics. Instead, they argued, the movement
should focus on the human and emotional aspects of the debate.
Id.
155. Id.
156. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 15, at 2.
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show many positive results, and NHTSA’s characterization of the
results has been more balanced. Nevertheless, these studies fall
short of providing conclusive evidence that .08 BAC laws by them-
selves have been responsible for reductions in fatal crashes.157
Despite stating that 0.08% laws can have some effect when imple-
mented in concert with other laws, the report also notes that the
individual effectiveness of per se statutes is in question.158 This is
contrary to claims made by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Association (NHTSA) in an effort to garner support for the laws.159 The
adoption of these laws by all states was predicated on the NHTSA’s
estimates of life-saving potential.160 The study President Clinton re-
lied on in making his claim of “600 fewer alcohol-related deaths each
year” was particularly critical in garnering support for the law.161
That study showed “a [sixteen] percent greater decline in the pro-
portion of alcohol-related fatalities among drivers” for states elect-
ing to follow the 0.08% BAC per se standard than in states retaining
the 0.10% BAC level.162 The methodologies of this study, however,
were roundly criticized.163 Instead, the GAO found that accurate esti-
mations could not be made with any certainty, stating, “[b]ecause a
state enacting a .08 BAC law may or may not see a decline in alcohol-
related fatalities, it is difficult to accurately predict how many lives
would be saved if all states passed .08 BAC laws.”164
Considering the conclusions of the GAO’s comprehensive report,
the best that can accurately be said regarding the ability of 0.08% per
se laws to save lives is that they can have some indefinite level of
effectiveness if enacted as part of a more comprehensive program.165
Even then, a state enacting such a statute is certainly not guaran-
teeing saved lives.166 Considering the discriminatory effect of per se
laws, the price of injustice is especially high given how little conclu-
sive evidence exists governing the effectiveness of the per se standard
in consistently preventing drunk driving deaths.167
157. Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Id. at 9-10.
161. Id. at 14. “These study results were endorsed by NHTSA and often cited in the
agency’s literature and public statements. President Clinton cited the study in a March
1998 statement and said ‘. . . if all states lower their BAC to .08, it will result in 600
fewer alcohol-related deaths each year.’ ” Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 22-23.
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Supposing for the sake of argument that per se laws do consis-
tently reduce the number of deaths resulting from drunk driving,
and imagining for a moment that these laws are the only means of
achieving such a reduction,168 there is still not ample justification for
keeping these laws in effect. The lifesaving effect of a law is hardly
the only factor that should be considered when evaluating the net
value or detriment of that law to society. Vastly more lives could be
saved if, for instance, laws were enacted prohibiting men from driving
altogether than by merely prohibiting them from driving with BACs
above 0.08%. Yet this law would not, and should not, be implemented
as its costs to society obviously outweigh the benefits.
In the case of per se drunk driving laws, the number of lives
saved may not be worth tolerating the prosecution of defendants who
are not actually dangerous and the gender-based discrimination this
entails. This is especially true considering that a large percentage
of the lives that advocates claim they are trying to save are those of
the drunk drivers or their passengers, adults who knowingly made
the choice to put themselves in danger and are aware of the potential
consequences.169 Although over 16,000 people may die in alcohol-
related crashes each year,170 by some estimates only 3,000 people
other than drunk drivers and their passengers die in these acci-
dents.171 While 3,000 is certainly a disconcerting number, per se
statutes cannot possibly prevent all of these deaths. The number of
lives at issue, therefore, is the difference between the number of deaths
under per se statutes and the number of deaths that would occur
under the next best alternative. Proponents of paternalistic laws may
disagree, but in the face of discrimination, states may have more
pressing concerns than protecting those who accept the risks associ-
ated with their own behavior.
The primary concerns of any drunk driving policy should be the
balancing of justice, societal utility, and the protection of citizens,
168. Alcohol-Related Impairment, ALCOHOL ALERT (Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism, Bethesda, Md.), July 1994, available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/
aa25.htm (proposing research into other means of detecting impaired drivers and
preventing deaths due to drunk driving).
169. Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?, 109(6)
J. POL. ECON. 1198, 1201 (2001) (“The great majority of alcohol-related driving fatalities
occur to the drinking drivers themselves and their passengers. Since these individuals
are likely to have willingly accepted the risks associated with their actions, the role for
public policy in preventing these deaths is unclear.”). The lives of drunk drivers are not
necessarily worth less than the those of innocent victims, but perhaps the loss of those
who choose to risk their own lives should be weighed less when considering the value
of a law than the loss of those that die from the recklessness of others.
170. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 15, at 5.
171. Levitt & Porter, supra note 169, at 1201.
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most importantly the 3,000 yearly innocent victims of drunk-driving
accidents. Per se statutes discriminate against men. By adopting per
se laws, lawmakers have neglected considerations of justice in favor
of lifesaving potential. Further, this lifesaving potential is disputed,
and alternative policies may offer a similarly effective outcome.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Perhaps the most compelling reason to move away from per se
drunk driving laws is the potential to enact laws that are just as
effective but have far fewer unintended and negative consequences.172
In the short run, a return to the status quo that existed prior to the
widespread adoption of per se laws may be the best option. In the
long term, however, continued research may lead to the development
of even more effective alternatives.
Prior to the adoption of per se laws, if a prosecutor could show that
a defendant had a certain BAC at the time of driving, such as 0.08%,
this was not an offense in itself.173 Rather, this created a rebuttable
presumption that the driver was sufficiently impaired to be found con-
victed under the traditional driving-while-intoxicated language.174
The court in Burg made reference to this previous standard:
Even these laws, which considerably assisted the prosecution of
“driving under the influence” cases, proved inadequate in many re-
spects. Under them, the ultimate question was defined in terms of
the defendant’s subjective behavior and condition: “Was the defen-
dant under the influence at the time he drove?” Celerity and cer-
tainty of punishment were frustrated by the ambiguity of the legal
criteria; no matter what his blood-alcohol level, a defendant could
escape conviction merely by raising a doubt as to his intoxication.175
The court speaks as if the opportunity and ability of a defendant to
raise doubt as to his innocence is an unjustifiable burden on the pros-
ecution. To the contrary, the opportunity to show that one was not
a danger, despite one’s BAC, is precisely the right a drunk driving
statute based on BAC should preserve. In this way, those who are im-
paired to a dangerous degree will be punished, and discrimination
will be averted, because men will have the opportunity to show that
they were not impaired. Although this does place an additional burden
172. Alcohol-Related Impairment, supra note 168.
173. Burg v. Mun. Ct., 673 P.2d 732, 735 (Cal. 1983).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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on the prosecution, this burden is not undue, as ease of prosecution
should defer to the pursuit of rightful convictions when possible.
Although the use of BAC to create a rebuttable presumption is
a satisfactory solution, the future may hold alternative possibilities.
During his time as Director of the NIAAA, Dr. Enoch Gordis recog-
nized the potential advantages of rejecting the per se standard and
proposed a more sensible and effective alternative:
By understanding how alcohol impairs complex mental functions,
we can develop ways to prevent many alcohol-related injuries by
negating alcohol’s ability to interfere with cognitive and motor
function. As neuroscience research matures, this may become pos-
sible. We also can prevent alcohol-related injuries by developing
easily deployed devices to measure impairment. Setting a legal
threshold for determining impairment by BAC (per se laws) has
disadvantages that might be avoided by use of an inexpensive,
convenient field device for determining impairment directly. Such
a device would have the advantage of identifying persons who are
unfit to drive or engage in other potentially dangerous activity for
any reason, such as extreme fatigue, illness, infirmity, emotional
states, or the use of alcohol and other drugs and medications.
Whether the public would endorse the use of such devices rather
than the current widely accepted and supported per se laws is
certain to be a matter of significant public policy debate.176
Legislatures should allocate funding to research Dr. Gordis’s vision.
Perhaps, in the future, life on the roadways would be safer and
more just.
CONCLUSION
In an effort to save lives and ease burdens on prosecutors, all
states have adopted per se drunk driving statutes that make driving
with a BAC of 0.08% a crime, regardless of actual impairment. Propo-
nents of 0.08% per se statutes place too much emphasis on the life-
saving potential and facilitation of expeditious prosecution the laws
offer, to the detriment of other valid concerns. Given the strong scien-
tific evidence that men are less impaired than women at a given BAC,
lawmakers should recognize that a “one size fits all” approach re-
sults in discrimination and, consequently, may not be appropriate.
Although per se laws certainly show some positive effects, the exact
magnitude and consistency of these effects are difficult to determine
176. Alcohol-Related Impairment, supra note 168 (emphasis added).
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and still in question. Given this nebulous level of effectiveness, law-
makers should not consider the discriminatory effect of 0.08% per
se drunk driving laws justifiable as a matter of public policy.
Currently the best alternative to per se laws is a reversion to
laws that create a rebuttable presumption of intoxication at 0.08%.
Drunk driving laws formulated in this way target those drivers who
are actually a danger to others. Further, under these laws, men will
not be discriminated against, because they will be free to prove that
they are not intoxicated at 0.08%, eliminating a potential discrimi-
natory effect.
In the long run, research should focus on the development of a
roadside device that can detect impairment directly. The proper
implementation of such a device could potentially allow for policies
that properly balance safety with other considerations.
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